BlackBerry's chance of revival is only 1%

Recently, BlackBerry released its third quarter financial report for 2014. The data showed that BlackBerry's revenue in the third quarter was US$1.2 billion, a year-on-year decline of 56%. The loss was as high as US$148 million, and the revenue fell by 13.43% from the previous quarter. The performance was dismal. BlackBerry's global market share has even fallen to only 1%. But from another perspective, under the leadership of BlackBerry CEO Chen Shouzong, BlackBerry has launched a series of revival measures and plans, such as restructuring BlackBerry, clarifying the responsibilities of each department and the company's future development strategy, focusing on investment in the security field, and implementing strategic contraction. BlackBerry also reached a five-year cooperation agreement with Foxconn and plans to produce cheap smartphones for Indonesia and other emerging markets, breaking the rumors that BlackBerry has abandoned its hardware business. In addition, BlackBerry also acquired virtual SIM card manufacturer Movirtu and encryption company Secusmart.

Chen Shouzong is known as BlackBerry's "firefighting expert" and some of his measures have achieved certain results. For example, compared with BlackBerry's net loss of $4.4 billion in the same period of 2013, this year's figure has dropped to a loss of only $148 million. BlackBerry's smartphone shipments in the second quarter increased by 15% from the previous quarter. Chen Shouzong also seems to be very proud and said not long ago that the possibility of BlackBerry's revival is 99%. But in today's market environment where there are many strong competitors and fierce competition, can the declining BlackBerry really usher in a revival under Chen Shouzong's leadership?

BlackBerry's new products lack highlights and competitiveness; full keyboard has become a burden for its revival

We know that BlackBerry launched the Passport phone in September this year, followed by the Classic. The Passport phone has some breakthroughs in product design and system performance, such as the new Siri-like voice assistant Blackberry Assistant, which uses Nuance voice recognition technology. But despite this, the Passport phone cannot carry the hope of BlackBerry's revival. The Passport phone uses the BlackBerry 10.3 operating system. Although the Passport phone already has a faster browser, a larger display and longer battery life, these are not very attractive and competitive compared to Android phones and Apple phones.

BlackBerry Passport and Classic both have full keyboards, but this design strategy can only retain some keyboard fans, but cannot attract more new smartphone users. It can be seen that BlackBerry is conservative in that it has no motivation or confidence in attracting new users, and hopes to use keyboards to stabilize its existing die-hard fans. This stubbornness and conservatism is quite similar to Nokia in the past.

When Apple launched the iPhone, its product logic was based on the user's entertainment needs, and communication was a functional attribute that gave way to the mainstream entertainment needs. This caused a subversion to Nokia from the product logic. Although Nokia was already on a declining track at the time and users had strong demand for entertainment applications, Nokia still stubbornly adhered to the idea of ​​defining mobile phones from the mainstream communication function. Today, when touch-screen mobile phones have become mainstream, BlackBerry still sticks to the full keyboard even though its market share has dropped to 1%. This is actually related to the company's own genes. In the face of the market tide, they cannot abandon the basic business and inherent logic on which they rely for success. It is inevitable that BlackBerry's revival will improve the system, enrich the number of applications, optimize the quality of the applications themselves, and compete with its competitors in the mainstream market in touch-screen mobile phones. In the face of trends, the full keyboard is obviously no longer able to build BlackBerry's core advantage, but has become a burden for BlackBerry's revival.

Software is not a potential revenue market but a weakness that drags BlackBerry into the quagmire

BlackBerry's third quarter financial report in 2014 showed that of the $1.2 billion in revenue for the quarter, about 40% came from hardware, 53% from services, and 7% from software and other businesses. In Chen Shouzong's view, the future software market will be a potential market for BlackBerry.

But we know that the download volume of BlackBerry's App World is too far behind that of Android App Store and Apple App Store, and they are not comparable. When BlackBerry 10 was first released, there were less than 80,000 applications, which is not even a fraction of the more than one million applications on Apple and Android. You know, the number and quality of applications are the cornerstones of the playability and entertainment of smartphones, but on BlackBerry phones, including Instagram, Snapchat, and Google series of mainstream Western applications are missing. When a phone lacks even basic applications, users will inevitably flee.

In this regard, BlackBerry's software ecosystem layout is similar to that of Amazon's Fire Phone, which has poor sales. The number of apps in Amazon's App Store is less than one-fifth of the number of apps in Apple's App Store or Android's App Store, which means that the lack of software ecosystem layout cannot attract enough application developers. It is obviously unrealistic to talk about profitability when the most basic application software is not in place.

It can be seen that the foundation of BlackBerry's software ecosystem construction is not yet stable. The poor experience from the system to the application has become a shortcoming in BlackBerry's ecological layout. In the context of the booming development of mobile Internet, the shortcomings of the application software ecosystem construction will lead to the continuous loss of users and the continuous escape of developers, which will lead to the continued inability to reverse sales and financial difficulties, dragging into a vicious cycle of losses. I am afraid that BlackBerry's future reliance on a short-board business for profit is just a wishful thinking.

Die-hard BlackBerry fans are highly vulnerable

In addition, many people believe that BlackBerry's classic full keyboard touch screen has many die-hard users. But are die-hard user fans really reliable?

In my opinion, BlackBerry made a wrong decision last year. It opened one of its core applications, BBM, to Apple iOS and Google Android platforms. BBM, which was born in 2005, was the world's first mobile social software. At that time, WeChat and WhatsApp had not yet appeared. At that time, BBM and email push services such as BIS and BES cultivated a large number of BlackBerry's die-hard fans, and also ensured the strong stickiness of BlackBerry's own system and the premium of mobile phone hardware. But after BlackBerry opened this application to Android and iOS, it also stripped away its core advantages.

When iOS and Android systems could also perfectly implement some of BlackBerry's unique applications and services, BlackBerry fans began to move to iOS and Android in large numbers. Since BBM lacked core highlights and advantages on iOS and Android platforms and other mobile social software, it became extremely unrealistic to generate revenue by opening up BBM. Therefore, this decision was equivalent to giving its own users to Apple and Google, further accelerating the decline in its own hardware sales.

In fact, this is easy to understand. Apple ensures the uniqueness of its operating system, software and app store through a closed system that integrates hardware and software, and also ensures user stickiness. If Android phones can also download the APP store to experience iOS applications, it will inevitably weaken Apple's unique advantage at the software level. Therefore, we can see that once BlackBerry's core applications are opened up, users will flee, and BlackBerry's so-called die-hard users are highly vulnerable.

BlackBerry's core security advantage in the enterprise market is being gradually eroded by Apple

In addition, when we look at the enterprise market, the industry also knows that BlackBerry has a group of individual and mid-to-high-end corporate enthusiasts and "die-hard" users and corporate users in Europe and the United States. BlackBerry CEO Chen Shouzong said that BlackBerry's future strategy will be to expand its business tentacles to medical, financial, legal and other corporate services through investment, mergers and acquisitions and cooperation, while increasing investment in the security field where it is most proficient.

However, focusing on the security field is unable to save BlackBerry from its decline. The die-hard users in this part of the enterprise market may still be more of BlackBerry's wishful thinking. We know that BlackBerry has always limited itself to the relatively niche field of secure mobile phones. Since Cheng Zongshou took over as CEO of BlackBerry last year, he has further implemented strategic contraction, focusing its user base on government and corporate customers, providing them with software and security services. For example, Passport and Classic are also mainly aimed at corporate users. So far, security may have been BlackBerry's only core advantage. Therefore, BlackBerry will hold on to this card tightly in its future strategy, but if the security advantage is no longer there, BlackBerry will lose its advantage in all fields.

At present, this core advantage is indeed gradually being lost. Although BlackBerry's secure and stable email service is the leader among the niche high-end government and enterprise customer base, due to BlackBerry's decreasing market share in the smartphone market, the security card is losing its audience base, and even Obama's support is of no avail.

It is reported that more and more enterprise users have terminated their business cooperation with BlackBerry and switched to iOS platform. Karl Keirstead, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, said: "Enterprises will tend to replace their original BlackBerry products with Apple's iOS8 operating system, rather than switch to BlackBerry's new enterprise management tool BES12 or just upgrade its functions." Some analysts also believe that the security of iOS8 will surpass BlackBerry, making iPhone and iPad more popular among enterprise users.

In addition, data shows that the customer base of enterprise mobile service provider MobileIron has expanded tenfold. Obviously, BlackBerry currently has only 1% of the smartphone market share. A mobile phone company that is in a continuous decline and weak market cannot bring enough security to users or companies. The factors that users consider include the following aspects: Will BlackBerry be acquired? Will the frequent changes in BlackBerry's management and engineers in the future lead to a lack of research and development of new devices and new technologies? Will the performance of the application ecosystem and MDM platform be surpassed by the more powerful iOS? Due to the weakness of the company, will it be forced to open its security data and information in some countries?

In addition, MobileIron also mentioned in a BlackBerry system migration white paper that the data usage on the iPhone has also increased significantly compared to the BlackBerry, which is more helpful for enterprise data information collection. Obviously, this is also an important reason why enterprise users are gradually switching to iOS.

In fact, loyal users will also start from market trends and their own interests, and rarely from loyalty to a brand. Nokia has far more die-hard users than BlackBerry, but it still loses to market rules and trends. We can also see that Apple's emphasis on security is no less than BlackBerry's. In addition, Apple has a strong global influence, user base and R&D capabilities, so it is expected that Apple will continue to take over BlackBerry's corporate user base.

China won't be BlackBerry's lifeline

Although the rumors of Lenovo's acquisition of BlackBerry have come to an end, it is a fact that Chen Shouzong has begun to contact Chinese regulatory authorities and technology companies. Chen Shouzong has also made it clear on several occasions in public that the Chinese market cannot be ignored and will also start business in China at the right time. But will the Chinese market be BlackBerry's lifeline? Obviously not.

When BlackBerry was at its peak, it only clung to the high-end market in Europe and America, ignoring the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific market of mobile Internet. In China, Motorola, HTC, Nokia and Samsung have all had their glory days in the Chinese market, and have a broad user base and brand base, but BlackBerry is not. When BlackBerry was at its peak, it was still in a tepid state in the Chinese market. In 2012, BlackBerry's revenue was US$18.423 billion, of which the Asia-Pacific market accounted for only US$2.67 billion. "BlackBerry" has almost never entered the mainstream market in China. Of course, this is also related to BlackBerry's neglect of the Chinese market, and also related to BlackBerry's "office phone" positioning is almost the opposite of China's national conditions and user tastes.

In the final analysis, BlackBerry lacks the foundation for user cultivation and brand foundation in China. BlackBerry has lost its best time to enter the Chinese market or the Indonesian market. In the low-end market, it is already a red ocean, and domestic mobile phones are the biggest obstacle for BlackBerry. In the high-end market, Apple's brand influence has been deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. Samsung is still in a tragic dilemma of its market share being continuously eroded in the Chinese market, and the Chinese market will not be a life-saving straw for BlackBerry.

BlackBerry's chances of revival are only 1%

The fact that two major mobile phone giants, Motorola and Nokia, were eventually acquired seems to have sounded a warning bell for BlackBerry. Once a technology company lags behind the trend of the times or its technology and products do not meet user needs, it will be abandoned by the market and its market value will often plummet. To exaggerate, it may even become a burden that is taken over and then abandoned by various companies.

The foreshadowing of BlackBerry's decline today was laid a long time ago. For example, it was once autistic and complacent, refusing to adapt to the trend of touch-screen experience and mobile ecological layout of mobile Internet smartphones, ignoring the Asia-Pacific market, underestimating users' entertainment needs, and being overconfident in its own brand. All of these caused BlackBerry to miss opportunities for a turnaround, ultimately leading to today's defeat.

To use the words of Bian Que, a famous doctor in the Warring States Period: If the disease is in the skin, it can be cured by hot water and ironing; if it is in the intestines, it can be cured by fire and Qi; if it is in the bone marrow, it is under the control of the God of Life, and there is nothing we can do about it. BlackBerry has missed the best time to turn things around. If it is delayed until the "disease reaches the bone marrow", the possibility of BlackBerry's revival is probably not 99%, but 1%. Cheng Shouzong's move is just to make adjustments in operations and market strategies, but it cannot reverse BlackBerry's long-standing and deepening chronic illness and its inherent disadvantages. And this 1% possibility depends on whether BlackBerry can seize the next wave of innovation and opportunities of smart phones, whether it can unload its burdens, find the right market entry point, and start the journey with ease.

Looking back, BlackBerry has always wanted to win back its die-hard fans through the full keyboard. As mentioned earlier, this is related to BlackBerry's own genes. This is the basic design that BlackBerry relies on for success, and BlackBerry obviously cannot get out of its own genes. But at present, BlackBerry fans with full keyboards also want to use it as a symbol of nostalgia. When a mobile phone is used as a nostalgic object, in fact, people have subconsciously classified it into a past era, and it can no longer represent the future.

As a winner of Toutiao's Qingyun Plan and Baijiahao's Bai+ Plan, the 2019 Baidu Digital Author of the Year, the Baijiahao's Most Popular Author in the Technology Field, the 2019 Sogou Technology and Culture Author, and the 2021 Baijiahao Quarterly Influential Creator, he has won many awards, including the 2013 Sohu Best Industry Media Person, the 2015 China New Media Entrepreneurship Competition Beijing Third Place, the 2015 Guangmang Experience Award, the 2015 China New Media Entrepreneurship Competition Finals Third Place, and the 2018 Baidu Dynamic Annual Powerful Celebrity.