Live streaming: Inflated, fake and difficult situations amid the microblog-style boom

Since Wang Sicong entered the e-sports industry in 2015, when he invested in Panda TV and launched the Banana Project, the entire e-sports live broadcast industry has exploded, and with it came the rise of pan-entertainment live broadcast platforms and show live broadcast platforms. If the most popular industry keyword in 2015 was Internet finance, the industry keyword in 2016 is undoubtedly live broadcast, as well as the Internet celebrities and anchors derived from it.

Judging from the rapid development of live streaming platforms over the past year, more and more irrational factors have begun to emerge, which is very similar to the prosperity under the Internet bubble:

• As long as the company sticks to live streaming, it is like riding on a rocket that takes off quickly. Both the valuation and media coverage are different from the past.

• VCs are crazy about it, and they want to invest in every company so that their own results can be spread throughout the live broadcast;

• The live broadcast platforms gave up their current profits, spent money madly to subsidize the anchors, and frantically produced works and invited celebrities to show their presence;

• The live streaming platform is frantically brushing up the data. The celebrity you invited today has exceeded the maximum number of 500,000 concurrent online users. I dare to break 1 million tomorrow.

Yingke is the best proof of this. Even though the most popular actresses like Erjie Qiujie only have a maximum of 10,000 concurrent online fans, and stars like Niu Mengmeng only have such figures, Luo Zhenyu's 200,000 fans are already amazing... until Ma Dong joined Yingke, it finally reached a peak of 2.4 million fans. Since then, any star who enters Yingke live broadcast is embarrassed to go out without 200,000 fans online at the same time.

Live streaming is very popular, as popular as group buying, p2p, and short videos before it... but more like Weibo before it. Live streaming is also beginning to enter an era of universal sharing in a way that is increasingly similar to Weibo.

Weibo went from being a national microblog to the last surviving Sina Weibo. Now, with the help of its live streaming function, its valuation has hit a new high. It is said that Yizhibo will soon be renamed Weibo Live. Live streaming is very similar to the former Weibo in terms of revenue generation, reliance on celebrities, control over content producers, and lack of profit model.

Will live streaming make you the next Weibo?

Live streaming is very popular. It only took two years from live streaming of shows to live streaming of e-sports to live streaming of all people.

The rise of live streaming can be traced back to show venues such as 9158 and Liujianfang, but they could only make money secretly. It was not until the listing of Tiange in July 2014 that everyone realized that show live streaming was so profitable.

Douyu and Huya, which were established in 2014, have undoubtedly become the leaders of the industry. They started with e-sports/game live broadcasts without copyright and accumulated a huge number of users. At that time, live broadcasting was still an industry that was not understood. However, after Periscope, the originator of mobile live broadcasting on the other side of the Atlantic, became popular at the SXSW Music Festival, it began to transform live broadcasting with Chinese characteristics. Inke and Huajiao were established one after another. Taiwan's 17 also quickly topped the App Store with pornographic information and was quickly removed from the shelves.

After that, Wang Sicong's investment in Panda TV officially ignited the industry. Many VCs crazily pursued it, and many players flocked in, including Alibaba, Momo, Tencent, Youku, 360, NetEase, Sina... According to data released by the Ministry of Culture in April, there are about 200 online live broadcast companies in my country. This number is still growing, with 1-2 companies entering this industry almost every week.

According to the data from the Sotu Research Institute, show live streaming applications account for the majority of live streaming applications on the market, accounting for 57.33%, and game live streaming accounts for 24.89%, becoming the two mainstreams in the live streaming industry. The post-90s and post-00s from the ACG world have also occupied a place through ACG live streaming websites such as Bilibili.

The industry's popularity has also made it popular in the capital market. According to incomplete statistics, 108 of the 116 known live broadcast apps have received financing. The financing of well-known live broadcast platforms was about 790 million yuan in 2014, and increased to 2.37 billion yuan in 2015, a growth rate of about 300%.

Now, live streaming has become a state where celebrities and ordinary people are broadcasting live to the public.

Many celebrities such as Li Bingbing, Gong Li, Jia Nailiang, Liu Yan, Liu Tao, and Wang Baoqiang have tried live streaming and have also been sought after; Internet celebrities such as Ayawawa, Zhang Dayi, Mu Yalan, and Wang Sicong are not far behind; business owners such as Luo Zhenyu of Luoji Siwei, Ma Dong of Miwei, and Gong Wenxiang, the e-commerce tycoon, have joined in, and even the richest man Wang Jianlin has willfully live-streamed a game of Landlord on a private plane... Live streaming by amateurs is also pouring in, with college students, white-collar workers, and high school students all starting to broadcast. According to iResearch data, the number of users of online live streaming platforms in China is 200 million.

Live streaming falls into Weibo-like dilemma

Weibo and live streaming are two industries that have existed for six years. One became popular because of the portal giant Sina, and the other because of Wang Sicong, the husband of the nation. One is entirely dependent on the investment of the parent company, and the other is wildly sought after by capital. One is based on 140 characters, and the other is centered on video interaction. One can only survive with the traditional profit model of advertising, and the other looks very lively with the reward model... It seems that the two have nothing to do with each other, but in fact, they have many connections inside. At the same time, the live streaming platform is getting closer and closer to Weibo in terms of model and business dilemma. Although the momentum is still at its peak, in fact, it has become the live streaming version of Weibo.

1. The control over the anchor, the most core asset, is extremely low

Weibo was born under the portal system, including Sina, NetEase, Sohu, Tencent, Phoenix, etc. The portal platforms are full of celebrities and content resources, and the halo brought by the media communication power is really great!

As the only one in the industry, Sina Weibo, relying on its accumulated experience in blogging, reused the celebrity model of blogging to form a combination of celebrity strategies, and at the same time, relied on its first-mover advantage to beat other platforms without any chance of fighting back, which also led to the huge influence of Xu Jinglei in the blogging era and Yao Chen in the Weibo era. The uniqueness of Sina Weibo also led to the rapid entry of Douban Tianya jokers and celebrities, and the "Global Fashion" and "Cold Jokes Selection" controlled by Jiuhong Binglan and Yin Guangxu, as well as the "Funny Ranking" of personal Weibo accounts, quickly occupied the Weibo hot list.

However, Weibo as a platform lacks control over celebrities, and it also has no control over KOLs who tell jokes. When Weibo was struggling to establish an advertising profit model, a large number of Weibo KOLs strongly opposed it. Even the control measures such as banning and account blocking were not very effective.

The limited control over content producers is also a dilemma faced by live streaming platforms. Live streaming is popular because the hosts are internet celebrities, KOLs and other charismatic figures. Users watch the individuals who broadcast live rather than the live streaming platforms themselves. Just like Xiaozhi and Vincent, after leaving their original platforms, they not only received huge base salaries from the new platforms, but also had many fans follow them to the new platforms. This is the same with television. When Wang Han went to "Mars Intelligence Agency" and Gao Xiaosong went to iQiyi, they not only guaranteed ratings, but also attracted old advertising sponsors. Let's see if the relationship between live streaming platforms and hosts is solid?

The live broadcast platform's support for anchors is divided into the following aspects:

1. Sign a small number of top anchors. Give a certain basic salary to high-quality anchors, and give preferential treatment in the sharing of gift income, but only those anchors at the top of the pyramid can enjoy this honor, such as Ruofeng, Xiaozhi, and Xiaocang.

2. Support some brokerage companies/unions to sign broadcasters. Brokerage companies have a large group of artists and can produce relatively high-quality and systematic content. Brokerage companies need platforms and popularity to make artists famous, and live broadcast platforms need high-quality content;

3. Create your own artists. Content is the basis for the survival and differentiation of live broadcast platforms, so the live broadcast platforms themselves are already creating their own variety shows or game columns, so it is only natural for them to create their own artists. This is also one of the effective ways to bind artists and platforms;

4. Provide resource support. For ordinary anchors, the most important demand is to gain income and fame through the platform. To achieve this demand, either the high user activity of the platform can bring higher income, or more promotion resources can be obtained.

Except for the first and third categories of anchors, the platform has weak control over the second and fourth categories of anchors, especially the huge number of fourth category anchors. As long as the new platform has more resources or interest guarantees, the original platform will not be able to retain these anchors.

But even the first type of anchors with strong control also face difficulties. There is a certain contract period for signing a contract. When the contract expires, the flow of anchors becomes inevitable. Especially in the current situation where top anchors are relatively scarce, it is not uncommon for anchors to jump to new platforms when their contracts expire. Douyu spent 60 million yuan to poach 6 people from Huya, and Huya did not show any weakness and poached other anchors from Douyu. Longzhu and Panda also poached dozens of people from the industry leader Douyu. After Xiaozhi's contract expired, he also moved from Panda to Quanmin TV. The expiration of anchor contracts also triggered a series of verbal battles.

Of course, in order to retain anchors, live streaming platforms have set a certain amount of basic salary (usually one thousand yuan), but they need to meet a certain monthly online time and the fans’ rewards must exceed a certain amount. However, almost most platforms have similar policies, so how can they restrict the mobility of anchors?

There is also a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the platform's e-sports anchors. If one day the game owner restricts the live broadcast copyright, for example, if Tencent requires other platforms not to broadcast LOL, will anchors such as Dong Xiaosa have to return to Douyu?

2. Spending money like crazy to gain market share

Since the Internet was popular, VC investment has become a major theme. In the entrepreneurial atmosphere, VC's pursuit has forced entrepreneurs to overdraw profits in advance, not seeking to make profits earlier, but to burn out their competitors and occupy the first place in the market. Therefore, the pragmatic Shanghai Gang has declined, and the idealistic Beijing Gang has risen. That is why Didi and Meituan dare to spend money crazily, but of course they are still a long way from making a profit.

Weibo is the same, with a single profit model, that is, advertising. The feeds flow was once widely criticized, but now everyone is used to it. After its birth, Weibo has been seeking an effective profit model, but it has made no achievements except advertising. How can advertising support an industry? Therefore, Weibo has always been a money-loser, and Sina Weibo, as the leader, has been the first to bear the brunt. Fortunately, after Alibaba invested in 2013, Sina Weibo officially made a profit from advertising. But Twitter in the United States still lost $577 million in 2015.

In terms of spending, live streaming platforms are even crazier than Weibo, and are even more comparable to group buying and taxi-hailing. In addition to online and offline advertising investment (in addition to Baidu's SEO, Inke has already started TV advertising bombardment), the broadband and operating costs of live streaming platforms are also a considerable expense. In addition to the cost of live streaming itself, the storage of historical live streaming content also increases the cost expenditure. The monthly bandwidth cost of first-tier live streaming platforms is around 20 million.

Live streaming platforms also spend a huge amount of money on content and anchors. Sponsoring or producing high-quality variety shows is also very expensive. Inke won the exclusive title sponsorship of BIGBANG's concert in 2016. According to Tencent Technology, the signing fee for the live broadcast of the three concerts alone cost 20 million yuan; Yizhibo also spent several million yuan to sponsor Song Zhongji's fan meeting; Faye Wong will hold a concert in Mercedes-Benz Shanghai on December 30 this year. With all the cooperation agreements negotiated, only the live streaming platform is still under negotiation. It is said that Ali Planet once offered 100 million yuan to try to win the exclusive live broadcast rights.

The cost of acquiring high-quality anchors has also been raised by the live broadcast industry, which is similar to the irrational pursuit of TV series and movie copyrights by video websites in the past.

Sohu IT reported that a list of anchors from an industry insider showed that from the beginning of 2014 to 2015, the value of game anchors experienced a rocket-like rise, generally increasing by more than 10 times. The most powerful "Xiaozhi" from Huya Live has a value of more than 20 million. According to an anchor who did not want to be named, all his income in 2014 added up to several hundred thousand, and the amount he received in 2015 was much higher than expected. People in the entertainment industry said that the current value of game anchors has reached or even exceeded the level of first-line stars.

Douyu's crazy pursuit of high-quality anchors led to it poaching six anchors from Huya in one month, with a total cost of more than 60 million yuan. Soon after, Huya poached a series of well-known game anchors from Douyu, including "Pis, Zhou, Bao, and Long". After these anchors switched to Huya, their net worth may exceed 10 million yuan.

Huya recently signed a contract with the couple Androni, a Hearthstone anchor, for 100 million RMB over three years. This amount of contract fee is equivalent to Huya's overall revenue in Q1 (Huya's revenue in Q1 2016 was 117.7 million RMB). Previously, Miss switched from Longzhu to Huya, and the contract fee increased by 50% from 20 million RMB to 30 million RMB. Former professional player PDD also switched from Zhanqi to Panda with a salary of nearly 100 million RMB.

Compared with the e-sports platform, the show mode seems much more "stingy". For example, the media revealed that the monthly salary of Inke's leading actress "Second Sister Alice" is only 60,000. But raising the anchor's value may end up like the video, and both will end up as losers!

Intensified competition has also caused the main profit model of live broadcast platforms - gift sharing - to become increasingly low. At this time, platforms with unions such as YY and 9158 have a sharing ratio of 32%, 8% and 60% for anchors, unions and platforms, and only when the monthly settlement exceeds a certain amount (such as 15,000) will there be a 100% commission.

After the rise of mobile live streaming, the ratio has basically been like this. It is common for the anchor and the platform to split the profits in a 3:7 ratio, such as Inke (32%:68%). On the Douyu platform, Yuwan deducts 20% (the deduction for Yuchi is higher); Huya platform deducts 50%; Zhanqi platform deducts 50%; Huajiao Live, as a latecomer platform, only deducts 10%, and at the same time, 10% will be returned to the anchor as event rewards, which means the platform will truly receive no commission. Xiandanjia followed suit and announced in March that it would reduce the platform share ratio to 10%. Of course, the more famous the anchor is, the higher the commission they will get.

In today's fierce competition among platforms, the anchors' share of the profits will become higher and higher, and the platform's income will become less and less.

3. Commercialization is hindered and unclear

The Internet business model is relatively simple. It is either selling goods, selling advertising, or selling privileged virtual products. The so-called selling of value-added services or membership privileges are just stories told by the platform to VCs.

Before Alibaba took over, Sina Weibo's commercialization had not been solved. Although Weibo was not in a hurry, its valuation had not been raised, and its user growth was also weak. Improving commercial realization became a new direction. However, many celebrities (such as Happy Family and Super Boy and Super Girl) and many joke writers had already made a fortune by virtue of their content advantages. The Weibo Funny Rankings were in short supply with a 1,000 yuan repost. The cold joke selection only accepted content soft ads and also made money lying down. When many big accounts made their first pot of gold, Sina Weibo did not get a penny. Finally, Sina Weibo built its own advertising trading platform and strongly promoted feeds flow. Only under Alibaba's transformation did it achieve sustained profitability.

Live streaming is facing a similar dilemma as Weibo did in the past. Live streaming is just a platform. The rise of the platform has created a large number of anchors who are individuals or economic companies. These anchors, as content producers and KOLs, are vehicles for attracting advertisers, and the platform has absolutely no control over them.

The only anchors that the platform can really control are those who have signed contracts. So the faces you see attending commercial events on live streaming platforms are all familiar faces. However, the artists controlled by economic companies have already started to cooperate with e-commerce companies for commercialization. This is also the helplessness of live streaming platforms, as they have no control over the commercialization of many anchors' advertisements. Currently, almost all live streaming platforms are trying to make their own variety shows, and even trying to connect TV and live streaming. In addition to being optimistic about the impact of content on platform differentiation, they are more importantly coveting the advertising revenue brought by variety shows. After all, the advertising revenue of "The Voice of China" and "Where Are We Going, Dad?" is as high as 1.5 billion, which is quite enviable.

Although live streaming platforms have a reward model similar to that of show venues, the platform share is far from enough to cover the costs of bandwidth and computer rooms. If live streaming platforms want to make profits, they can just learn from 9158, but if they want to gain recognition from capital and users, they must now de-show venues. De-show venues mean a reduction in reward revenue for a certain period of time. In 2015, Huya Live lost about 378 million yuan, and Longzhu's operating income in the first half of 2015 was 58.85 yuan, but its losses reached 52.12 million yuan.

4. Platform data fraud is rampant

In the context of China's Internet, the cruel competition and anxiety caused by the financing dilemma have caused many platforms to turn data falsification into a tried and tested weapon in order to gain the favor of capital or spread PR, and finally they are forced to continue falsifying data.

Early Weibo had a feature that was clearly different from Twitter, which was to display the number of comments and reposts (Twitter did not launch this feature until 2015). This was extremely suitable for individuals to assess their own influence. Mao Ge also saw that many public relations companies used the number of Weibo reposts and comments exceeding a certain value as an indicator that PR needed urgent intervention, which shows the value of data.

Therefore, Weibo’s data fraud is mainly reflected in the three perceptible parts of the number of fans, the number of reposts, and the number of comments (now also the number of likes), but Weibo itself does not have much motivation to falsify data, and falsification at a non-overall level is completely worthless to Weibo. Therefore, the data fraud for a single Weibo account is solved by a large number of Weibo marketing companies. However, when the data is falsified, it is bound to lead to an increase in the number of registered users and active users, which is also what Weibo is happy to see. When the marketing company’s fraud affects Weibo’s interests, Weibo will introduce rules to cancel zombie fans and raise the registration threshold.

The biggest difference between live streaming platforms and Weibo is the change in the subject of fraud. The live streaming platforms themselves have become the source of fraud because of the difficulty and cost of fraud, as well as the difference in the value of the platforms. Although Taobao has services to increase fans of live streaming platforms, it has never been popular because people watch the number of tips and viewers, not the number of fans.

Platform A shows that the number of people watching game live broadcasts exceeds the number of Chinese netizens. In 2014, a mobile phone launch live broadcast had 200 million viewers when the number of real users was at the million level. Tiger Sniffing beauty Wang once complained that when she was live streaming on platform B, her fans came in one after another and the number was increasing at a steady rate, but no one interacted...

An e-sports anchor once revealed the rules for falsifying the number of people on his live broadcast platform. For example, if there is 1 person in your live broadcast room, the number will be displayed as 1, 100 people will be displayed as 231, 200 people will be displayed as 500, 500 will be displayed as 2000, and 10,000 will be displayed as 50,000. The more real people there are in your live broadcast, the greater the multiplier, and the maximum multiplier is 10.5 times.

In addition to data fraud, there are also proxy players. The proxy game incident of Miss Ayi triggered a series of chain reactions. Dong Xiaosa, the mentor of the YY Star Development Program team where Ayi is, posted a Weibo saying that proxy players are everywhere in China's live broadcast industry, revealing the fraud model of beautiful women + proxy players + behind-the-scenes team = making money from fans in the domestic live broadcast industry.

Brushing turnover is also a key means of operational fraud. Entertainment Capital Theory revealed in a previous article: Internet celebrity brokerage companies can get a 50% discount by recharging large quantities to the live broadcast platform. For example, an Internet celebrity brokerage company spent 20 million yuan to recharge the live broadcast platform, and after obtaining a 50% discount, it was equivalent to getting 40 million virtual currency. The brokerage company spent this 40 million virtual currency on its own Internet celebrity accounts, and then divided the 40 million income with the live broadcast platform 50-50, and the brokerage company could get back the 20 million it paid. In other words, the brokerage company did not actually lose anything, but it made its own Internet celebrity popular. At the same time, the Internet celebrity account gained a lot of turnover, and the live broadcast platform also obtained a lot of high-quality data.

From this we can see that the falsification of transaction data in the live broadcast industry is not done by one party alone. The live broadcast platforms, anchor brokerage companies, and anchors are all involved, and an unspoken understanding has been formed.

5. Over-reliance on celebrities to produce content, ordinary users lack a sense of presence

The influence of celebrities has contributed greatly to the popularity of Sina Weibo. Weibo has used its media value and industry accumulation to quickly attract celebrities and big V resources, changing the way users obtain information and satisfying their needs to interact with idols and peek into the lives of celebrities. Opinion leaders have also brought many fans to Weibo, stimulating the overall activity of Weibo. Weibo's social relationships have in turn strengthened user activity. Tencent and NetEase Weibo had to leave the market regretfully because they lacked the early accumulation of opinion leaders.

With the crazy pursuit of VCs in 2016, live streaming platforms started a crazy process of rapid development. Celebrities have become the biggest weapon. Major platforms have frantically used celebrities to increase their presence, either by inviting celebrities to broadcast or by sponsoring celebrity concerts to refresh the number of users and online viewers.

In 2014, LeTV sponsored Wang Feng's concert tour in Beijing, and tried paid live broadcasting for the first time; Inke sponsored BIGBANG's 2016 China tour; ME Live won the exclusive broadcasting rights for Lu Han's concert; Yizhibo and Huajiao sponsored Song Zhongji's concert...

Many celebrities have also tried live streaming. Wang Baoqiang, Wang Feng, and Deng Ziqi joined Douyu; Liu Yan, Hua Chenyu, and Jolin Tsai joined Huajiao; Zhu Dan, Chen Yanxi, Li Xiaolu, and Liu Ye joined Yizhibo; Fan Bingbing, Liu Wen, Gong Li, Li Bingbing, and Zhang Yixing joined Meipai; Sun Jian, Gao Yuanyuan, Luo Zhenyu, and the Zhao Family joined Inke; Lin Yuner, Ruan Jingtian, Chen He, and Lin Chiling joined Huya; Angelbaby, T-ara, and JJ Lin signed with Panda; Marco, Park Nima, Jay Chou, and Xue Zhiqian started broadcasting Dragon Ball...

But celebrity live streaming brings two problems:

1. Stars cannot be retained. Haven’t you seen stars doing video live broadcasts? On the one hand, star live broadcasts will not be the norm. Domestic stars are high and mighty. Although live broadcast platforms are real-time interactive platforms for fans, it is impossible for first-line stars to completely lower their status. The ones who really lower their status are either training groups like SNH48 and Super Girls, or down-to-earth grassroots artists like Zhao Family Class. Most stars will not lower their status on live broadcast platforms for a long time. You can see Ma Dong say thank you to XX baby for the Porsche, but can you imagine Fan Bingbing saying thank you to XX baby for the cucumber? On the other hand, the non-long-term live broadcasts of stars bring low loyalty to the platform. When there are new activities that need to rely on live broadcast platforms, whichever platform has better resources and which platform has better relationships, the star will flow to that new platform. Zhang Yixing used to live broadcast on Meipai, and when Lao Jiumen was released, he started broadcasting on Star Space; Li Chen used to live broadcast on Xiandanjia, and started broadcasting on Tencent one month later; Luo Zhenyu broadcast on Yizhibo after broadcasting on Yingke; some activities are broadcast on multiple live broadcast platforms at the same time...

2. Ordinary users lack a sense of presence. Opinion leaders in the cold start period are the key to the success or failure of a product, but over-reliance on opinion leaders is also a shackle for companies after they become popular. After Sina Weibo became a new generation of social tools with the help of celebrities and joke makers, the excessive pursuit of celebrities resulted in one celebrity to many fans and a channel for fans to obtain information, while the social needs of ordinary users were not met. Weibo gradually fell into silence until it improved after Alibaba's investment and the rise of live broadcasting.

Live streaming also faces this problem. The threshold for ordinary people to participate in live streaming platforms is the highest, because it is difficult to obtain prizes and the psychological satisfaction of fans. Ordinary people's live streaming is also the least favored by the platform. Ordinary people's live streaming is called amateur live streaming, and it is difficult to get the platform's recommendation. The platform does not care much about such content, which will result in ordinary users not having a strong sense of presence. Live streaming has no social relationship chain. When the novelty of ordinary users wears off, live streaming is bound to decline.

VI. Copyright and Regulatory Risks

The problems that all UGC platforms need to face are regulatory risks and copyright risks. In 2009, Fanfou was shut down for more than a year because of the Xinjiang incident. There are also many platforms that have been restricted due to copyright issues. Qvod and Renren Video died, and Sina and NetEase Technology Channel were also shut down. The government background behind Sina Weibo makes Sina easy to deal with regulation, but it also faces a lot of regulation.

Live streaming platforms face more uncertainty. Pornography has already exploded, but regulation is also a problem. Currently, there are already grandmother-level anchors talking about things during the Cultural Revolution... Live streaming UGC brings more uncontrollable and widely disseminated content.

There are also problems with content copyright. On the one hand, live streaming platforms attribute copyright to personal behavior, emphasizing that technology is innocent. Mao Ge saw an account on Platform C playing Hong Kong gambling movies and Wang Jing's movies 24 hours a day, and it is also common to secretly film dramas and concerts. Some types of e-sports live streaming games are also at risk. If one day Tencent announces that LOL can only be live streamed with authorization, if one day Blizzard announces that Hearthstone can only be live streamed on NetEase...

Live streaming platforms have been popular since the end of 2015, and it has only been more than half a year. This year is a critical year for live streaming platforms. Most of the reshuffle of live streaming platforms will be completed. In the end, only one or two will be able to gain the continued favor of capital and survive. Whoever is more open and can better solve these six problems is likely to survive longer.

But what is the future of live streaming? It is definitely not in live streaming itself, but in the combination of live streaming and traditional industries. It is no longer important whether this step is initiated by traditional platforms (such as WeChat and Zhihu) or whether live streaming platforms extend to new industries.

This article is authorized to be published by Huxiu.com and edited by Huxiu.com. Please indicate the author's name at the beginning of the article when reprinting this article, keep the integrity of the article (including Huxiu's notes and other author's identity information), and attach the source (Huxiu.com) and the link to this page. Original link: http://www.huxiu.com/article/152411/1.html

As a winner of Toutiao's Qingyun Plan and Baijiahao's Bai+ Plan, the 2019 Baidu Digital Author of the Year, the Baijiahao's Most Popular Author in the Technology Field, the 2019 Sogou Technology and Culture Author, and the 2021 Baijiahao Quarterly Influential Creator, he has won many awards, including the 2013 Sohu Best Industry Media Person, the 2015 China New Media Entrepreneurship Competition Beijing Third Place, the 2015 Guangmang Experience Award, the 2015 China New Media Entrepreneurship Competition Finals Third Place, and the 2018 Baidu Dynamic Annual Powerful Celebrity.